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The emergence of internationally intethat led to our present agricultural dilemma grated financial and commodity markets and may be debated, but it is clear that: (1) the the growing importance of agricultural trade current economic-financial environment of have and will continue to have profound agriculture bears little resemblance to that impacts on agriculture and agricultural capof the pre-1970's; (2) the direction for the ital markets. Furthermore, the competitive future is clouded by uncertainties; and (3) forces of international markets will exert the manner by which the current financial pressure on domestic agricultural product dilemma in agriculture is resolved will have and input prices. Rural communities, instia major impact on the scenario for the longer tutions, and farmers are no longer sheltered term future.
from the competition in national and inter-A major characteristic of the current eco-national financial and commodity markets. nomic-financial environment is that forces Movement towards flexible exchange rates outside agriculture play a dominant role in set the stage for a major restructuring of the determining the current and future state of international financial system. Concurrently, the agricultural industry and the welfare of but not coincidentally, commodity markets agricultural producers and investors. Some were also undergoing significant change. Many of those major forces are the emergence of countries were relying on the commodity remarkably well integrated international cap-markets as a source of foreign exchange earnital and commodity markets, drastically re-ings. While the term "petrodollars" conveys structured domestic financial markets, an this notion of the integration of capital and expansive domestic fiscal policy confronted commodity markets, a similar transition was by a restrictive monetary policy, a less than occurring in agricultural markets. Shocks to buoyant world economy, and continued balance of payments positions attributable to instability in world energy markets. One con-the commodities markets necessarily quicksequence is that the U.S. economy and U.S. ened the pace of this evolution and forced agriculture are no longer effectively isolated institutional changes in domestic markets. from impacts of international markets. Rather, Under a regime of fixed exchange rates, the United States is a part of what may best current account (trade of goods and services be characterized as a one economy world, plus net earnings on foreign investments, and and U.S. agriculture is an integral part of an net transfers) deficits were matched by capinternational food system. ital account (money lent or invested) surIn this paper, some of the major forces pluses or by central banks adjusting reserves. shaping the agricultural environment for fi-In the past, changes in balance of payments nancing agriculture over the remainder of positions were due primarily to shifts in tradthe century are examined. Emphasis is given ing preferences. Currently, under floating exto identifying the major variables and insti-change rates, with minor and infrequent James S. Plaxico is a Professor and Glenn J. Knowles is an Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University.
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central bank interventions, current account deficits would help, but the present outlook deficits must be offset by capital account is that it will take some years for these deficits surpluses. The floating exchange rate is the to decline to the $100 billion range. In the equilibrating mechanism that forces a bal-long run, an increase in private savings will ance in total payments. be required to eliminate trade deficits. A The current account deficit in the United surplus of capital funds abroad, largely from States in 1984 was around $120 billion, and petrodollars, from Japan whose maturing is projected to be the same in 1985, as com-economy and high savings rates will increase pared to a surplus of $6 billion in 1981. The their net international investment, and from United States will therefore be importing a less demand by developing countries who large amount of capital from abroad. By his-must resolve their current debt repayment torical standards, the dollar is priced high problems first, may help keep the U.S. capital relative to trade weighted averages of other account in balance. currencies. The basis for this situation is One disturbing facet of the high value of largely a change in investment preferences the dollar is the resurgence of a protectionist (Feldstein) and relative savings rates, thus a climate in the United States. Protectionism new importance has been placed on the cap-could be detrimental to U.S. agriculture since ital account in the balance of payments. The other countries will retaliate against our exeffect is that the dollar is strong, but not ports and spur foreign countries on to selfovervalued. The reasons for the increased sufficiency in food production, thus further attractiveness of U.S. investments has been diminishing U.S. agricultural exports. In adlower perceived risk, lower expected infla-dition, it could slow the flow of capital into tion, and large budget deficits in the United this country, thereby exerting upward presStates.
sure on interest rates. What are the implications of this new international order for U.S. agriculture? First, DOMESTIC FINANCIAL MARKETS the potential supply of capital to agriculture
The late 1970's and early 1980's have is greater than it would have been if capital brought unparalleled changes in U.S. finanmarkets were not internationalized. The cial markets. Financial institutions, instrubudget deficits, instead of only crowding out ments, and practices comprise financial domestic capital, also influence the larger markets at local, national, and international pool of international capital. This includes levels. The function of financial markets is U.S. investments abroad. U.S. banks claims to provide for a system to channel savings abroad were $25 billion in 1983, down from into investments, bear risks, and provide for $111 billion in 1982. Without the infusion efficient transactions and payments (Barry) of foreign capital, interest rates would be In the public interest, financial markets have higher and financial stress in agriculture long been subjected to close scrutiny by a would be more severe than now.
variety of regulatory agencies. Regulations The increased importance of the capital and legislation affecting financial markets have account in the balance of payments is a two-traditionally restricted geographic expansion edged sword. The demand for capital in the of financial institutions, limited the scope of United States has forced a high value of the services provided by the different institudollar by historical standards, but not over-tions, controlled interest rates paid on the valued vis-a-vis other currencies. Thus, U.S. various classes of deposits, established capagricultural exports are less competitive in ital and liquidity requirements, and set loan international markets. While the agricultural limits. trade balance in fiscal 1984 was up slightly
From an uncontrolled industry in the early from the 1983 level, it was far below the history of the country, restrictions were imlevel in 1981, and the U.S. share of agricul-posed gradually on financial markets. During tural trade was down.
the crisis depression years, itl order to staAn increase in net national savings in the bilize financial markets, restore public conUnited States will be necessary to reduce the fidence, and improve the survival probabilities exchange rate of the dollar and simultane-of financial institutions, financial markets were ously balance the capital and current ac-subjected to an array of regulations and sevcounts. Increasing the supply of capital to eral new financial institutions were estabthe private sector by decreasing federal budget lished. Social, economic, and technological developments during the 1970's created depository institutions of a given class were pressures to alter and relax the regulatory required to pay identical rates on deposits, climate. After numerous reviews and analyses small savers deposited their funds in local of likely implications, Congress passed the institutions which in turn created a pool of Depository Institution Deregulation and Mon-loanable funds available to local farmers and etary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980 and the other business people. In general, it appears Depository Institute Act (DIA) of 1982.
that to date local financial institutions have In general, DIDMCA and DIA provide for effectively competed with money center ina phasing out of interest rate ceilings on stitutions so that there has been no massive deposits, authorize interest bearing transac-movement of rural area deposits to metrotion accounts, and give federally chartered politan areas. However, loan demand during thrift institutions authority to make con-the post deregulation period has not been sumer, commercial, and agricultural loans as unusually strong. well as to provide transaction accounts. The
Deregulation has raised interest rates to overall effect of the legislation and regulatory borrowers due to the disappearance of cost directives of the early 1980's has been de-free deposits and increased rate volatility rescribed as "providing for a level playing field" flecting national and international financial for competing financial institutions. Clearly, market conditions. At the same time, derethe array of financial services that the differ-gulation and access to national and internaent institutions offer has been broadened, the tional markets permit capital to flow to various institutions are less specialized, and geographic areas offering the most favorable competition among institutions has been terms. Thus, funds available to banks for local greatly enhanced.
lending are no longer limited to locally genThe Congress, to date, has elected to defer erated savings and deposits. As financial into the various states with respect to regula-stitutions consolidate and restructure, larger tions concerning geographic expansion of effective lending limits will permit banks to banking activities. Several states have re-more adequately serve large scale commercently enacted legislation permitting limited cial agriculture. An often voiced concern is branch banking and multi-bank holding com-that deregulation and restructuring will cause panies. Numerous banks have loan produc-capital to flow to the financial centers so that tion offices in various states and the local interests will be less well served. HowComptroller of the Currency in October 1984 ever, there is a paucity of hard evidence in approved several consumer or "non-bank" support of this view. banks with branches in several states. However, full service (deposits and commercial THE COOPERATIVE FARM CREDIT loans) interstate commercial banks are not SYSTEM now authorized, although the concensus prediction is that interstate banking is imminent.
The Farm Credit System (FCS) held 44 The implications of the decontrol of finan-percent of the farm real estate debt, 20 percial markets and the restructuring of insti-cent of the non-real estate debt, and 33 pertutions are far reaching. Small savers have cent of total farm debt on January 1, 1985. access to market rates of interest that pre-Thus, the FCS is currently a major, if not the viously were available only to large savers dominant, source of debt capital for agrithrough unregulated jumbo C.D.'s, and the culture. The FCS long ago developed a strucvarious interest bearing transaction accounts ture that facilitates utilization of national and provide a form of cash management to con-international capital markets to provide loansumers and small business firms. With un-able funds to agriculture, along with a naregulated interest rates, savers can "shop" tionwide distribution system. In many for the best combination of interest rates and respects, the architects of the FCS created an other service. As a consequence, deposits may institution with many of the attributes and be less stable within individual institutions advantages that commercial bankers are curand within the various geographic regions, rently seeking through restructuring. The FCS and the overall cost of money to lenders has has a very strong capital base, as compared been increased, to other lenders, but has limited loan diIn effect, removal of interest rate ceilings versification options. has transformed local financial markets to
In anticipation of a decade of further national and international markets. When all change, the FCS initiated an extensive study and planning process, designated Project are well developed. The same is not the case 1995, with the objective of designing and for agricultural equity capital. Currently, agimplementing thoughtful change. The var-ricultural equity markets are highly localious analyses and reports flowing from Project ized, informal, and probably inefficient. The 1995 examine the likely future environment same is the case for the long term asset leasing for the FCS, identify major issues, and suggest markets. Institutional barriers, such as the alternative strategies. Project 1995 will ap-prohibition of alien and/or corporate ownparently be a continuing process of strategic ership of farm land, no doubt account in part planning at all levels in the System. In reading for the lack of a formal organized market in the various Project 1995 summary docu-agricultural asset equities. However, other ments, one can easily conclude that greater factors such as the extra-market value placed market penetration may be a major objective on land, the desire to "preserve the family of the System. farm," and similar agricultural fundamentalIn the Project 1995 report relating to fi-ist views are no doubt contributing factors. nancial markets, the agency status issue is As suggested earlier, decontrol of financial addressed (Farm Credit System, 1984a, p. markets has increased financial risks in ag-30). Options are identified in the event loss riculture and in other industries, and we are of agency status becomes a reality. The op-aware of no evidence that business risks in tions are defined in terms of clientele to be agriculture have been moderated. This would served and funding source options. The re-suggest a need for a market for spreading the moval of agency status for the FCS has been agricultural equity risk over a broad base. evaluated by Lins and Barry. The agency ad-Clearly, the investment banking industry and vantages over other lenders in acquiring loan-other financial service entities have in place able funds enumerated by Lins and Barry the instruments to provide equity investment include the implicit government backing of opportunities in agriculture on an organized securities, certain regulatory exemptions and market base that would provide liquidity. preferences, and limited tax exemptions. They However, such markets will develop only if cite arguments for and against removal of agricultural equity instruments provide reagency status.
turns comparable to other investments with An affirmative act of Congress would be similar risk and liquidity characteristics. Alrequired to remove the FCS agency status. though the future course of events with reGiven the current financial stress in agricul-spect to ownership structure is far from clear, ture, loss of agency status or imposition of it seems inevitable that there will be a trend a "user fee" for the FCS appear to be remote toward separation of the ownership and oppossibilities. If the current situation persists, erating functions. an explicit guarantee would appear to be a more likely possibility. Such a guarantee could CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND assure an orderly flow of funds to qualified FINANCIAL STRUCTURE borrowers, despite continuing stress on the System and the industry.
Capital requirements in agriculture, in real FCS borrowers are in the unique position terms, are determined by the rate of capital of being equity owners of their creditor. Dur-formation in the industry. When decisioning a period of financial stress, this dual makers elect to invest in technology to enrelationship has the potential to create a hance output, to improve efficiency, or to problem for the System. If borrowers are augment industry financial capital, capital aware of loan loss sharing obligations, and if formation can occur at a rapid rate. Much of the association capital base is eroding, there the capital in agriculture is specialized to may be a tendency for the better credits to the extent that it is difficult to transfer to migrate to other lenders, thereby placing fur-other industries. However, real negative capther stress on the institution. Depending on ital formation (disinvestment) may occur as the specifics of the loan loss agreement, the a consequence of failure to maintain capital district and the System could also be affected. stocks as assets depreciate or by causality losses.
EQUITY CAPITAL
Capital requirements in agriculture can be met by cash flow (retained earnings) from The preceding discussion suggests that fi-the industry, by a net infusion of equity capnancial markets for agricultural debt capital ital from non-agricultural sources, or by debt capital. The financial structure of the industry SUBSIDIZED CREDIT refers to the mix of equity and debt capital in the industry at a point in time. It is well known that agriculture has traditionally been Subsidized credit refers to loans made unlargely equity financed.
der terms more favorabl tthan those available It should be clear, however, that capital from private sources, and to loans that would formation at either the micro or the macro nt be approved by private lenders. In 1983, levels is not necessarily related to the demand federal or federally assisted lending acfor debt finance. As entities enter and exit counted for $86 billion, or 17 percent of the industry, the rate of capital formation funds advanced in U.S. credit markets may be zero although the demand for debt (Lieblich). The subsidies associated with difinance and the financial structure may change rect loans made by the Federal Government at both the firm and industry levels. Consider in 1983 have been estimated at $8.3 billion, two producing units, "A" and "B", with the with 70 percent of the subsidy value profinancial characteristics described below.
vided through loan programs of USDA. Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) loans for both real estate and non-real estate have "A" "B" "C" been increasing in absolute amounts and relAssets $200,000 $100,000 $300,000 ative to other lenders. 1982, 1983, and 1984 . Thus, subsidized credit is a sigIf "B" exits agriculture and the assets are nificant agricultural finance policy issue. acquired by "A" to create "C", then debt
The Joint Economic Committee has defined required to finance the combined assets in-a subsidy as "any one-way government concreases from $25,000 to $120,000 or a net trolled income transfer to private sector increase of $95,000. This of course occurs decisionmaking units..." (Lieblich). Credit because in exiting agriculture "B" has trans-subsidies may be designed to alter the strucferred $95,000 of equity from agriculture to ture of resource control, re-distribute inanother sector. A major point is that farm come, stabilize prices, or alter production consolidations accomplished by farmers have levels. In a very broad sense, FCS loans could a major impact on the demand for debt and/ be considered subsidized loans since agency or equity capital even though the rate of status may reduce the cost of funds to capital formation is zero. The same results FCS. Likewise, Commodity Credit Corporacan occur if operating farmers use debt cap-tion (CCC) commodity and facility loans ital to meet cash operating cost requirements.
could be subsidized loans due to the nonDuring the late 1960's, Melichar and Doll recourse feature in the case of commodity estimated the capital withdrawn from the loans and the possibility of terms more fafarming sector by sellers, primarily retiring vorable than private sector loans in the case farmers and non-farm heirs. The Melichar and of facility loans. However, for purposes of Doll estimates suggest that over the 1965-69 this discussion, CCC loans will be ignored period real estate transfers accounted for al-since they are primarily associated with the most 40 percent of total capital flow. It should price support programs and FCS loans are be pointed out that capital withdrawals from excluded since they involve no direct govthe industry by departing farmers arising from ernment funds and are generally considered the sale of non-real assets should be treated to be "bankable" loans. The discussion is in the same manner as real estate. Likewise, further limited to FmHA farmer loans. equity investments in agriculture by nonFmHA direct and guaranteed loans are the farmers should be considered.
primary sources of subsidized loans in agriIt is clear that capital formation less debt culture, although the Small Business Adminflow is not an adequate estimate of the use istration (SBA) is involved to a very limited of cash flow requirements to finance a chang-extent. The loans of primary interest are the ing agricultural structure. The problem is FmHA ownership and operating loans, as well particularly acute during periods of rapid as their disaster and economic emergency farm consolidation or during periods of loans. Currently, the FmHA ownership loans change in the ownership structure.
are limited to $300,000 in the case of insured (direct) and $400,000 in the case of guar-natural and economic risks inherent in aganteed loans made by a third party. Farm riculture, again the issue is how the public operating loans are limited to $200,000 and can most efficiently assume its share of the $400,000 for insured or guaranteed loans, risk. The alternatives available appear to enrespectively. The disaster (natural) and eco-tail some version of the current loan pronomic emergency loans are limited to grams or an insurance type program. One $500,000 and $400,000 respectively. FmHA attraction of an insurance program is that direct loans carry interest rates based on the more debt does not appear, in many cases, government cost of funds and guaranteed to make a positive contribution to the afloans are made at rates charged other bor-fected individuals. rowers in the private sector. Economic emergency loan authority expired September 30, 1984 . INFLATION, DEFLATION, AND 1984 . STRUCTURE Not surprisingly, FmHA has been criticized STRUCTURE for making loans that are too large and too Several analyses suggest that farmland prices small, and for failure to foreclose soon enough are determined by anticipated returns from and for foreclosing too soon. Much of the farming (e.g. Melichar, 1983) . It has also criticism of FmHA has been directed to the been argued that farmland prices are deterdisaster and emergency loan programs. These mined mainly within the farm sector (Phipps) . programs have fewer restrictions than the These results would seem to suggest that ownership and operating loans, thus larger, holding land as an inflation hedge or as a more affluent farmers are eligible for the "collectible" would have little, if any, imloans.
pact on land prices. Data, methodology, and It is apparently the wish of citizens and interpretation limitations should suggest cauthe Congress that debt capital be made avail-tion in accepting these conclusions (Plaxico able to limited resource, primarily younger, and Kletke; Plaxico, 1979) . However, reindividuals who desire to become established gardless of the structure determining land in agricultural production and who have a prices, the impact of capital gains and losses reasonable chance of succeeding. Clearly, on the size structure in agriculture is a relsuch loans are high risk ventures. Thus, it is evant issue. not prudent for the private sector, including When land prices were rising during the FCS, to extend such loans. The relevant issue 1970's, land investments were often thought is how can society most efficiently channel of as being analogous to investments in a debt capital to limited resource farmers. growth stock. For an established landowner, Insured (direct) FmHA ownership and op-it was easy to expand by leveraging (moneerating loans are subsidized by lower than tizing) the increased equity in existing land private sector interest rates, and loans are holdings to acquire equity in additional land. made that would not be made in the private Some economists suggested, and numerous sector, thus involving a significant implicit expansionary landowners practiced, borrowrisk premium. Also, continuing loan super-ing against an increasing equity to meet mortvision is provided without cost to the client. gage payment and other cash requirements. In recent years, there has been a growing This was possible because many lenders, in interest in and use of guaranteed loans. These spite of an otherwise declared policy, were loans are administered by private sector en-quite willing to lend on the basis of assets tities, are 90 percent FmHA guaranteed, and with little regard for cash flow from operacarry market interest rates. They are attractive tions. Thus, without doubt, available financto private sector lenders because the guar-ing accompanied by low and even negative anteed portion of the loans are marketable real interest rates stimulated farm consoliin upstream financial markets and exposure dations and the consequent rapid increase in is limited by the guarantee. Yet, there is an debt of expanding farmers. incentive for the lender to be judicious in More recently, land asset values have shrunk extending loans since there is a significant and the real rate of interest is relatively high. exposure for the lender.
Thus, the opportunity to borrow against an Disaster and emergency loan programs are increasing land equity is no longer available difficult to administer. If, as appears to be and lending institutions appear to have shifted the case, the public and the Congress are from asset based to cash flow based lending. willing for the public to share the major As a consequence, some landowners have 108 found it necessary to forfeit all or a part of tend to tilt the structure toward larger units. their holdings due to their inability to meet If, however, established producers who did payment requirements. One question is, how not expand rapidly during the 1970's view will these voluntary and/or mandatory for-land, at or near current prices, as a good feitures impact on the size structure? investment, the redistribution may be size The initial impact of the current crisis ap-neutral. pears to be that lenders are becoming large landowners. The ultimate impact on structure will likely depend on the period over MANAGEMENT OF FINANCIAL which the current situation persists, the level INS to which asset values decline, lender strategy regarding disposition of farmland acquired, Deregulation, volatility, and intense comand who ultimately purchases the land. Lend-petition have had a profound impact on the ers are currently confronted with a major management options of financial institutions. policy decision regarding whether or when Prior to deregulation, local capital market to foreclose on non-performing loans, and deposits (loanable funds) tended to be highly whether to hold foreclosed properties in in-stable. Thus, managers attempted to maintain ventory or to finance a sale to another op-a level of loans in relation to deposits that erator. Foreclosure and immediate sale would optimize the overall portfolio in terms inevitably means a realized loss to the lending of institutional objectives. With deregulation, institution and possible further depression of there is no easy relationship between decollateral values. Failure to foreclose exposes posits and loans since by adjusting rates, the the lender to the possibility of greater losses. deposit base of individual institutions can be Holding foreclosed property exposes the adjusted, thus expanding available options. lender to the possibility of negative cash In short, it is now possible, and mandatory, flows and further capital losses. Thus, there that attention be directed to managing both is no easy choice.
the asset and the liability sides of the instiDebt is not uniformly distributed in agri-tution's portfolio. culture. USDA has estimated that on January With stable interest rates, it was often con-1, 1984, 18 percent of farm operators had sidered prudent for a financial institution to debt/asset ratios of 40 percent or higher. Yet, acquire long term assets (loans) on the basis these operators held 56 percent of the farm of short term liabilities (deposits). It is that debt and owned 14 percent of farm assets. practice that has created difficulties in many Of farms with sales of $500,000 and above, savings and loan institutions. Thus, changing 33 percent of the operators had debt/asset and volatile interest rates expose the financial ratios of 40 percent or above, but these op-institutions to extreme risks, unless the risk erators owed 60 percent of the debt of the is passed to the borrower or risks are managed group and owned 16 percent of the groups by properly managing both assets and liabilassets. Thus, these and other data sources ities. show that a disproportionate share of the debt The changing role of the managers of fiis owed by a relatively small percent of op-nancial institutions is a relevant issue in agerators that are younger than average and ricultural credit from at least three operate larger units. It is important to rec-perspectives. First, in order to assess the viognize that a further decline in asset values ability of an institution as an agricultural will cause a further deterioration in ratios of lender, one must appraise how agricultural highly leveraged individuals while in the ag-loans fit in the institutions overall portfolio. gregate the effect may be minimal.
Second, if survival of rural financial instituPrivate estimates suggest that if the current tions as agricultural lenders is thought to be farm income situation persists for two more desirable, there is a major research and edyears, 20-40 percent of commercial farms ucation opportunity in aiding institution will fail. If this in fact occurs, a variety of managers to adjust to the role required in scenarios are possible. If asset values decline the contemporary environment. Third, there to a point that production becomes profit-is a need for assessing ways that financial able, non-farm based equity, such as corpo-institutions might best manage the increasing rate entities and pension funds, may view risks in financial markets in some manner agricultural land as an attractive investment other than by simply shifting the risk to borfor earnings and capital gains. This would rowers through variable interest rate loans.
FARM FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT tural lending institutions, particularly small is abun l cr tt od h d rural unit banks with undiversified portfolios. It is abundantly clear that good husbandry i not a sufficientgco rs If the current financial situation in agriis not a sufficient condition for success in culture is considered to be a temporary pheagricultural production given the current and nomenon, and it is considered desirable to probable future environment. Changes in the macro fi l environment have e improve the survival probabilities of farmers macro financial environment have created and/or lending institutions, a publicly supmajor challenges for managers, their advisors, portedprogra mightbeconidered On and for academic financial experts. For exf a . F possibility would be a loan guarantee proample, the current period is the first period g fo te poble fam loans he gram for the problem farm loans held by of declining asset values experienced by the om rcial lending institutions For examvast majority of involved individuals. Thus, pie, given the foregoing estimates, a 90 pera major issue relates to how financial man-cent loan guarantee program would appear agement and decisionmaking expertise can to involve a curren exposure of abou $55 best be provided to production agriculture b ( billion ($61 x .9). The program could inmanagers. Some of the alternatives are to volve market interest rates plus an insurance expand extension education efforts directly f t fund to be paid to the administering agency to producers, to provide extension education order to capture the benefits of gegrphi in order to capture the benefits of geographic for financial institution personnel who would diversificatio The guarantee coud be lifted diversification. The guarantee could be lifted in turn work with producer-customers, and o or transferred to a private insurer when the to encourage development of third party con-crisis is alleviated suiting expertise that would be available on Obviously, the program outlined is similar a fee basis to producers. a fe bais at o uers.e . to recent FmHA programs, but it is not clear It is likely that the financial planning sup-that FmHA should administer the program port system that eventually evolves will be outlined here are e outlined. There are persuasive arguments for some combination of the options cited. In establishing a small new "independent and any event, it is apparent that a quantum exa t a '^~~~~ .
,^ .. ^.temporary" agency to avoid the conflict of pansion of financial expertise in the public objective thawould be involved in a FmHA sector, primarily in the Land-Grant System, administered program and to clearly separate is indicated. Subject matter expertise will be i from subsidized credit programs. If the required in financial analysis, financial mar-pogrm were limited to pro ers that have kets, risk management, financial institution chace o succei ie a legitimate chance of succeeding, given an management, and related areas. manageme, ad r d mprovement in the agricultural economy, the ultimate cost could be modest and the program might be structure neutral.
CRISIS MANAGEMENT POLICY
USDA reports indicate that the 17.7 percent CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS of farm operators who had debt-to-asset ratios of 40 percent or more owed 56.2 percent of There have been major changes in the agthe farm debt January 1, 1984, or about $86 ricultural finance environment, in the strucbillion of the $153 billion owed to institu-ture of financial markets, and in the tions excluding CCC. Presumably most, if agricultural production sector. Further not all, of the $24 billion held by FmHA plus changes are in store. In general, the envisome $1 billion of FmHA guarantees fall in ronmental changes have resulted in a more the 40 percent or higher debt/asset ratio direct linkage of local, national, and intercategory, leaving perhaps $61 billion unin-national capital and commodity markets. The sured in the portfolios of other institutions, internationalization of agriculture has reThe economic survival of many of the op-suited in increasing volatility and has made erators with such high debt ratios, and who it much more difficult to predict the course have limited non-farm cash flow, is clearly of economic variables. Financial markets and in jeopardy given the current economic state the agricultural sector are restructuring to of agriculture. Further, it is difficult for lend-better cope with the emerging environment. ers to prosper when their customers are hav-It seems clear that debt capital will be availing difficulties. Thus, a continuation of the able to agricultural producers, deemed credit current situation may lead to significant farm worthy, on a competitive basis at a cost rebusiness failures and to failures of agricul-flecting opportunity costs in other industries as well as volatility and other risk elements. Over the longer run, a broad based program The future is less clear with respect to the of finance research and teaching should be development of agricultural equity markets a priority concern. Apparently, the bio-techand the provision of financial expertise and nology (land based "star war" equivalent) is services to agricultural managers. receiving strong emphasis. Although tangible Environmental and structural change place applied results are unlikely in this decade or tremendous stress on the financial skills of even this century, bio-technology is likely to agricultural production managers. The short generate major shifts in relative resource and run critical problem for leveraged managers product prices, thus putting even greater is financial survival in the face of disinflation stress on the financial management function. involving shrinking asset values, depressed
The manner in which financial expertise commodity prices, and the apparent necessity is made available in agriculture is uncertain of shrinking aggregate production capacity. and yet to be determined. It may be via the How this crisis period is managed in the conventional extension structure. An alteraggregate will, to a large extent, dictate fu-native may be via independent consulting ture options.
firms or by employees of financial instituFinance is one of the areas that has been tions. Emergence of more agricultural proendured with benevolent neglect in many duction firms organized by financially oriented land-grant institutions. Thus, it is not clear (vs. husbandry) individuals and groups may that the expertise exists to provide the re-also be seen. Still another possibility may search and education base for dealing with be an equity market-financial management the current financial stress in agriculture. package.
